Related provisions for MAR 1.3.18
1 - 11 of 11 items.
The following are examples of behaviour that may amount to insider dealing under the Market Abuse Regulation, but are not intended to form an exhaustive list:5(1) [deleted]5(2) front running/pre-positioning - that is, a transaction for a person's own benefit, on the basis of and ahead of an order (including an order relating to a bid)4 which he is to carry out with or for another (in respect of which information concerning the order is inside information), which takes advantage
The5 following factors may5be taken into account in determining whether or not a person'sbehaviour5 is in pursuit of legitimate business, and are indications that it is:(1) the extent to which the relevant trading by the person is carried out in order to hedge a risk, and in particular the extent to which it neutralises and responds to a risk arising out of the person's legitimate business; or(2) whether, in the case of a transaction on the basis of inside information about a
The5following factors may5 be taken into account in determining whether or not a person'sbehaviour in executing5 an order (including an order relating to a bid)41 on behalf of another is carried out legitimately in the normal course of exercise of that person’s employment, profession or duties5, and are indications that it is:(1) whether the person has complied with the applicable provisions of
COBS2
, or their equivalents in the relevant jurisdiction;
5With reference to article 9(4) of the Market Abuse Regulation, examples of using inside information solely for the purpose of proceeding with a merger or public takeover may include:(1) seeking from holders of securities, issued by the target, irrevocable undertakings or expressions of support to accept an offer to acquire those securities (or not to accept such an offer);(2) making arrangements in connection with an issue of securities that are to be offered as consideration
The following descriptions are intended to assist in understanding certain behaviours which may constitute insider dealing under the Market Abuse Regulation and5 concern the definition of inside information relating to financial instruments other than
commodityderivatives or emissions allowances or auctioned products based thereon:5(1) X, a director at B PLC has lunch with a friend, Y. X tells Y that his company has received a takeover offer that is at a premium
The following description is intended to assist in understanding certain behaviours which may constitute insider dealing under the Market Abuse Regulation and5 concerns the definition of inside information relating to commodity derivatives.Before the official publication of LME stock levels, a metals trader learns (from an insider) that there has been a significant decrease in the level of LME aluminium stocks. This information is reasonably expected to be disclosed in accordance
The following description is intended to assist in understanding certain behaviours which may constitute insider dealing under the Market Abuse Regulation and5concerns the definition of inside information relating to pending client orders.A dealer on the trading desk of a firm dealing in oil derivatives accepts a very large order from a client to acquire a long position in oil futures deliverable in a particular month. Before executing the order, the dealer trades for the firm
The following connected descriptions are intended to assist in understanding certain behaviours which may constitute insider dealing under the Market Abuse Regulation and concern5 the differences in the definition of inside information for commodity derivatives and for other financial instruments.(1) A person deals, on a
trading venue5
, in the equities of XYZ plc, a commodity producer, based on inside information concerning that company. (2) A person
7ESMA has issued guidelines under article 7(5) of the Market Abuse Regulation which relate to the definition of inside information in the context of commodity derivatives. [Note: ESMA guidelines: Information relating to commodity derivatives markets or related spot markets for the purpose of the definition of inside information on commodity derivatives, 17 January 2017/ESMA/2016/1480 (EN)8.]
3Issuers should be aware that ESMA has issued guidelines under article 17(11) of the Market Abuse Regulation which contain a non-exhaustive indicative list of the legitimate interests of issuers to delay disclosure of inside information and situations in which delayed disclosure is likely to mislead the public: see the ESMA MAR delayed disclosure guidelines4.
(1) Delaying disclosure of inside information will not always mislead
the public, although a developing situation should be monitored so that if
circumstances change an immediate disclosure can be made.(2) Investors understand that some
information must be kept confidential until developments are at a stage when
an announcement can be made without prejudicing the legitimate interests of
the issuer.
(1) In the FCA’s opinion, paragraph 5(1)(8)(a) of the ESMA MAR delayed disclosure guidelines does3 not envisage that an issuer will: 2(a) delay public disclosure of the fact that it is in financial difficulty or of its worsening financial condition and is limited to the fact or substance of the negotiations to deal with such a situation; or2(b) delay disclosure of inside information on the basis that its position in subsequent negotiations to deal with the situation will be jeopardised
An issuer should
not be obliged to disclose impending developments that could be jeopardised
by premature disclosure. Whether or not an issuer has
a legitimate interest which would be prejudiced by the disclosure of certain inside information is an assessment which
must be made by the issuer in
the first instance. 321
(1) [deleted]2(2) Selective2 disclosure cannot be made to any person simply
because they owe the issuer a
duty of confidentiality. For example, an issuer contemplating
a major transaction which requires shareholder support or which could significantly
impact its lending arrangements or credit-rating may selectively disclose
details of the proposed transaction to major shareholders, its lenders and/or
credit-rating agency as long as the recipients are bound by a duty of confidentiality.
An
The5 following factors may5 be taken into account in determining whether or not a person who possesses inside information ought to know that it is inside information for the purposes of the final indent of article 8(4) of the Market Abuse Regulation5:(1) if a normal and reasonable person in the position of the person who has inside information would know or should have known that the person from whom he received it is an insider; and(2) if a normal and reasonable person in the
The5 following factors may5 be taken into account in determining whether or not information has been made public5, and are indications that it has5 (and therefore is5 not inside information):(1) whether the information has been disclosed to a prescribed market or a prescribed auction platform3 through a regulatory information service or RIS or otherwise in accordance with the rules of that market;(2) whether the information is contained in records which are open to inspection
The following are examples of behaviour5 that might fall within the scope of article 14(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation5:(1) a director of a company, while in possession of inside information, instructs an employee of that company to
sell a financial instrument5 in respect of which the information is inside information;(2) a person recommends or advises a friend to engage in behaviour5 which, if he himself engaged in it, would amount to market abuse.
If an issuer is
relying on article 17(4) or 17(5) of the Market Abuse Regulation1 to delay the disclosure of inside
information it should prepare a holding announcement to be disclosed
in the event of an actual or likely breach of confidence. Such a holding announcement
should include the details set out in DTR 2.2.9 G (2).
4Disclosure of inside information by a broker to a potential buyer regarding the fact that the seller of
financial instruments5
is a person discharging managerial responsibilities or the identity of the person discharging managerial responsibilities or the purpose of the sale by the person discharging managerial responsibilities where:(1) the disclosure is made only to the extent necessary, and solely in order to dispose of the investment;(2) the illiquidity
The5 following factors are to be taken into account in determining whether or not the disclosure was made by a person in the proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, and are indications that it was:(1) whether the disclosure is permitted by the rules of a
trading venue5
a prescribed auction platform,3 of the
FCA
or the Takeover Code; or(2) whether the disclosure is accompanied by the imposition
The following descriptions are intended to assist in understanding certain behaviours which may constitute unlawful disclosure under the Market Abuse Regulation:54444(1) 4X, a director at B PLC has lunch with a friend, Y, who has no connection with B PLC or its advisers. X tells Y that his company has received a takeover offer that is at a premium to the current share price at which it is trading.(2) 4A, a person discharging managerial responsibilities in B PLC, asks C, a broker,
An issuer and
its advisers are best placed to make an initial assessment of whether particular
information amounts to inside information.
The decision as to whether a piece of information is inside
information may be finely balanced and the issuer (with
the help of its advisers) will need to exercise its judgement.Note:DTR 2.7 provides additional guidance
on dealing with market rumour.
(1) [deleted]1(2) If an issuer is
faced with an unexpected and significant event, a short delay may be acceptable
if it is necessary to clarify the situation. In such situations a holding
announcement should be used where an issuer believes
that there is a danger of inside information leaking
before the facts and their impact can be confirmed. The holding announcement
should:(a) detail as much of the subject matter
as possible;(b) set out the reasons why a fuller
announcement
The FCA is aware that many issuers provide unpublished information to
third parties such as analysts, employees, credit rating agencies, finance
providers and major shareholders, often in response to queries from such parties.
The fact that information is unpublished does not in itself make it inside information. However, unpublished
information which amounts to inside information is
only permitted to be disclosed in accordance with the requirements of the Market Abuse Regula
Where there is press speculation
or market rumour regarding an issuer,
the issuer should assess whether
a disclosure obligation arises under article 17(1) of the Market Abuse Regulation1. To do this an issuer will need to carefully assess whether
the speculation or rumour has given rise to a situation where the issuer has inside
information.
The knowledge that press speculation
or market rumour is false may not1 amount to inside
information. If1 it does amount to inside
information, the FCA expects that there may be cases where1 an issuer would be able
to delay disclosure1 in accordance with article 17(4) or 17(5) of the Market Abuse Regulation1.
Examples of when the FCA may require the suspension of trading of a financial instrument include:(1) if an issuer fails to make an2 announcement as required by the Market Abuse Regulation2 within the applicable time-limits which the FCA considers could affect the interests of investors or affect the smooth operation of the market; or(2) if there is or there may be a leak of inside information and the issuer is unwilling or unable to issue an appropriate2 announcement required
(1) [deleted]65(2) 5An
individual may be a "senior executive", as defined in article 3(1)(25)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation,6 irrespective of the
nature of any contractual arrangements between the individual and the issuer and notwithstanding the absence of
a contractual arrangement between the individual and the issuer,
provided the individual has regular access to inside information relating,
directly or indirectly, to the issuer and
has power to make managerial decisions